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Representing Victims of Vocational School Fraud
Alan A. Alop*
The last decade has seen an explosion in the
number of vocational schools. Such schools,
also known as trade or proprietary schools, offer
the promise of careers in diverse areas, such as
the cosmetology, secretarial, truck driving, travel
and medical assistant fields. Most trade schools
now target unemployed young people, especially public aid recipients. The burgeoning
number of schools is directly attributable to federally guaranteed student loans and federal
grants now available to vocational school students. The dramatic growth of these schools has
been accompanied by a growing number of
complaints from students regarding misrepresentations by the schools, the quality of education offered and other significant abuses. Students frequently charge that promised training
or equipment is not provided; that advertised
"big-paying jobs" are illusory; and that some
schools are complete shams-four walls, a textbook and little else. This article will explore possible approaches in representing victims of trade
school fraud.
I. Statutory and Regulatory Backdrop
The regulatory backdrop and statutory framework in which vocational schools operate include state licensure or approval of vocational
schools and regulation of these schools through
a state administrative agency. In Illinois, for
example, two separate statutes and administrative agencies regulate vocational schools. Illinois cosmetology and barber schools come
under the provisions of "The Barber, Cosmetology and Esthetics Act of 1985," III. Rev. Stat. ch.
111, pars. 1701-1704 (1987), and the regulation of
these schools is the responsibility of the Department of Professional Regulation. All other Illinois vocational schools come within the provi-

sions of the "Private Business and Vocational
Schools Act," Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 144, pars. 136-162
(1987). These schools are regulated by the Illinois State Board of Education.
The effectiveness of state regulation of trade
schools, while varying from state to state, has
generally been inadequate. These administrative agencies may have limited resources, and
the monitoring of vocational school activities
may take a low priority in the agency. Moreover,
students are usually unaware of the identity of
the regulatory agency and so seldom file formal
complaints. Even when such complaints are
made, the agency may not adequately investigate or adjudicate them. State legislation is frequently insufficient to deter improper activities
by proprietary schools, and most state laws do
not afford a private right of action to aggrieved
students.
There is a second layer of "regulation" of
vocational schools-national or regional accrediting agencies. These are nongovernmental, private associations, generally formed by the
schools themselves, to provide peer evaluation.
The primary function of each accrediting agency,
as suggested by its name, is to "accredit" a vocational school or, subsequent to accreditation, to
withdraw this status where necessary. A separate
accrediting agency exists for each type of school
(e.g. cosmetology, travel, etc.). Accreditation is
normally not a prerequisite for a school to operate in a state; most states allow non-accredited
schools to do business so long as the state
agency has licensed or approved the school.
(continued on page 36)

*Director,Consumer Litigation Project, Legal Assistance Foundation
of Chicago; B.A., University of Illinois; J.D., University of Chicago.

Vocational School Fraud

(from page 33)

However, accreditation by a regional or national
accrediting agency is often the key to a school's
financial success because the federal government will only provide federally guaranteed
student loans and federal grant monies to students registered in schools accredited by the
appropriate private accrediting agency.1 In fact,
the Secretary of the Department of Education
("DOE") is required by federal law to recognize
those accrediting agencies which are determined to be reliable authorities as to the quality
of training provided by educational institutions. 2
A listing of all nationally recognized accrediting
agencies is published annually by DOE.
Formal complaints can be lodged with the
school's accrediting agency in instances of egregious school conduct, particularly where a pattern of misconduct may exist. The accrediting
agency will normally have formal rules and regulations regarding student complaints and procedures which can result in sanctions against
non-complying schools, including withdrawal
of accreditation. Unfortunately, complaint procedures may provide only minimal due process
protections for the complainants. For example,
complaint procedures of the National Accrediting Commission of Cosmetology Arts and Sciences ("NACCAS"), the national accrediting
agency which evaluates beauty schools, do not
provide students who file complaints with any
notice of the disposition of their grievances and
do not allow students or their representatives to
attend hearings in which their complaints are
adjudicated. 3 Accrediting agencies engage in
"self-regulation" which cannot be expected to
be as rigorous as independent policing. Yet,
because the legitimate schools have an interest
in weeding out the unscrupulous members of
the industry, an accrediting agency may occasionally take strong action where governmental
entities have failed to act.
A third layer of regulation of vocational
schools isfederal legislation and regulations that
govern accredited schools whose students obtain guaranteed student loans and/or grants. For
example, the federal "Guaranteed Student Loan
Program" ("GSLP"), the most common governmental loan available to trade school students, is
provided for in 20 U.S.C. §§ 1071-1087 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986). DOE regulations which flesh out
the GSLP are set out at 34 C.F.R. § 682 (1987).
Federal grant legislation-the Pell Grant Program, formally known as the Basic Educational
Opportunity Grant-is found at 20 U.S.C. §
1070a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). DOE implementing
regulations are codified at 34 C.F.R. § 690 (1987).

The GSLP and Pell Grant legislation and their
implementing regulations prescribe eligibility
rules for students and schools but contain few
substantive qualitative standards to which
schools must adhere.
While Pell grants are administered directly by
DOE to the accredited school, GSLP loans are
not. Instead, students enter into GSLP loan agreements with local financial institutions, which
generally issue a check in the name of the student and the school. These loan agreements are
guaranteed by a "guarantee agency," which is a
state governmental agency or a private nonprofit organization that has an agreement with
4
DOE to administer the loan guarantee program.
Ifthe student defaults, the financial institution is
reimbursed by the guarantee agency. If the guarantee agency is unable to collect the loan, the
DOE becomes the ultimate guarantor.
Many students who are defrauded by vocational schools remain unemployed and, as a
consequence, ultimately default on their student loan payments. Although DOE stands to
lose millions of dollars as the result of fraudulent
conduct by vocational schools, historically it has
failed to promulgate regulations which substantively govern the education provided by accredited vocational schools. DOE has instead relied
on the policing efforts of the accrediting agencies and state administrative agencies. However,
as a result of the enormous increase in student
loan defaults, the DOE has recently proposed a
regulation which would suspend or terminate
loans to schools with a student loan default rate
in excess of 20 percent.s
A fourth source of regulation of vocational
schools is the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC").
In 1978, the FTC adopted a broad rule requiring
proprietary schools to make numerous disclosures to prospective students regarding employment, earnings and drop-out information of
prior students at the school.6 Armed with this
information, students could avoid schools with
abysmal track records. However, the FTC has
recently terminated this Rule. 7 The FTC has,
however, also promulgated "Guides for Private
Vocational and.Home Study Schools" which are
in effect. 8 While these guides do not have the
force of law, they are designed to articulate "the
factors which would guide Commission decision[s]." FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S.
46, 48 (1965). The guides prohibit a wide variety
of conduct including, inter alia:
(a) use of a name or insignia which tends to
mislead prospective students with respect
to the nature of the school;

(b) misrepresentations regarding state approval or accreditation by a national accreditation agency or association;
(c) misrepresentations regarding the size, location, faculty, facilities or equipment of
the school;
(d) misrepresentations regarding the nature
or extent of any prerequisites for enrollment;
(e) use of deceptive sales practices; and
(f) use of deceptive pricing or misuse of the
word "free." 9
The FTC has also instituted numerous proceedings against vocational schools under § 5(a)
of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTCA"),
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1982), which declares that
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices in... commerce" are unlawful. For example, the FTC has
challenged schools that misrepresented employment and earnings potentiallo and falsely promised job placement to students. 1 FTC decisions
hold that schools may not misrepresent school
admission policies or terms of federally insured
student loans. 12 In other decisions, the Commission has ruled that a school may not misrepresent to prospective students that its graduates will
be qualified to practice the trade in which they
receive training. 13 While individuals do not have
a private right of action under the FTCA,14 the
decisions of the FTC in this context may, as discussed below, provide precedential value under
state statutory counterparts of the FTCA.
II. Litigation Approaches
In the absence of effective governmental or
industry regulation, litigation may be the only
alternative for victims of trade school abuses.
Several causes of action are discussed below.
A. Common Law Fraud
Many vocational schools misrepresent their
courses, career opportunities, or other material
facts in order to obtain a student's enrollment.
Common law fraud is an appropriate cause of
action where a school has: (1) made a statement
of material fact; (2) known to be false by the
school; (3) made to induce the student to enroll
or otherwise act; and (4) the student has relied
on the false, material statement. Steinberg v.
Chicago Medical School, 69 III. 2d 320, 333, 371
N.E.2d 634,641 (1977). In addition to actual damages, a student may recover punitive damages in
a fraud action "where the false representations
are wantonly and designedly made." Home Savings & Loan Association of Joliet v. Schneider,
108 III. 2d 277, 284, 483 N.E.2d 1225, 1228 (1985).

B. "Little FTC Acts"
Every state has adopted some form of legislation designed to afford consumers wide-ranging
protection in a broad variety of contexts.15 These
laws are often patterned after § 5(a) of the FTCA,
which prohibits unfair and deceptive acts or
practices. As a consequence, the state versions
are sometimes referred to as "Little FTC Acts."
Typically, Little FTC Acts provide the consumer
with an additional litigation tool with several
advantages. The Illinois version illustrates the
usefulness of a Little FTC Act in the context of a
vocational school fraud case.1 6 Under the Illinois
Little FTC Act provision, the consumer need not
allege or prove all the elements of common law
fraud in order to prevail. 17 Instead, a Little FTC
Act claim may be established by simply showing
a "misrepresentation, concealment or omission
of a material fact with intent that others rely on
that fact." Perlman v. Time, Inc., 133 III. App. 3d
348, 353, 478 N.E.2d 1132, 1136 (1st Dist. 1985).
Actual and punitive damages may be recovered,
as well as attorney fees.1 8 The Illinois statute, like
many other state versions, specifically directs
the courts to give consideration to FTC interpretations and federal court decisions relating to §
5(a) of the FTCA in construing the Illinois provisions. 19 Incorporation of the broad consumer
protection concepts of the FTCA makes state
Little FTC Act provisions excellent means to
address vocational school misconduct.
C. RICO
Another statute which may provide redress to
victims of trade school abuse is the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968 (1982). This federal law provides a private civil action to recover
treble damages and attorney fees for injuries
resulting from a violation of its substantive provisions. 20 Four elements must be present to
establish a RICO violation:
(1) A "racketeering activity" which is defined
in terms of violations of specific state and
federal criminal statutes ("predicate acts"),
such as mail fraud as prohibited in 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986);
(2) An "enterprise" which includes any person, partnership, corporation or other
legal entity;
(3) A "pattern of racketeering activity," which
requires at least two acts of racketeering
activity to have occurred; and
21
(4) injury to business or property.
(continued on page 38)
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While the metaphysical dimensions of RICO's
language may be initially disconcerting, the
broad application the Supreme Court has given
RICO compels a closer look.22 A vocational

school may constitute an "enterprise" within
RICO's definition. Mail fraud may exist if the
school has engaged in fraudulent conduct and
has used the mails in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme. For example, where a student is
induced to enroll in a course of study by oral or
written misrepresentations, and the school uses
the mails to receive student loans to finance the
course of study, or to secure enrollment applications, mail fraud may exist. A current area of
controversy in RICO concerns the issue of what
constitutes a "pattern of racketeering activity."
Cases examining this question have held the
inquiry to be fact-specific.23 Courts have scrutinized a variety of factors, including the number
and variety of predicate acts, the duration of the
period in which they were committed, the
number of victims, the presence of separate
schemes, and the occurrence of distinct injuries.2 4 Generally, where a systematic abuse is

present, with numerous victims and multiple
mailings, a RICO violation may exist.
D. State Vocational School Acts
Another litigation tool may be a state statute
enabling students to bring a private action for
violation of its provisions. Perhaps the most
stringent example of such a law was recently

enacted by the State of Illinois. 25 The new law,

effective January 1, 1989, includes broad, substantive requirements for Illinois vocational
schools. For example, the law requires the state
regulatory agency to conduct an annual review
and investigation of each school. The review is
required to include a comparison between the
school's student graduation or completion rate
and similar rates for schools within the particular
industry. Schools that fail to maintain graduation
rates greater than 50% of the industry average
are to be placed on probation for one year.26 If,
by the end of the following fiscal year, the school
still has not achieved a graduation rate greater
than 50% of the industry average, it will lose state
approval to operate. 27
The Illinois law also mandates the detailed
disclosure of pertinent information to students
prior to their enrollment.28 Students must be
informed that they may cancel their enrollment
within five business days; if this right is not disclosed, the student may thereafter cancel at any
time and receive a full refund.29 Disclosure must

also be made to the student of the number of
students who enrolled in the school during the

school's last fiscal year, the number who failed to
complete the course, the percentage who did
not complete the course, the number and percentage who passed the State licensing examination, the number and percentage of graduates
who obtained employment, and the average
starting salary of the school's graduates.30 Stu-

dents will also be notified in the disclosure form
of the name, address and telephone number of
the appropriate regulatory agency, and that
complaints 31
against the school may be filed with
the agency.

Further, the Illinois law sets out a schedule
which specifies and provides for refunds to students who withdraw based on the time they
attend the institution. 32 Thus a student who
withdraws from the school after the first day of
class and before 5%of the course of instruction
must only sacrifice the application fee and 10%

of the tuition or $300, whichever is less. 33 This

new schedule provides greater refunds to students than under prior Illinois law. If the school
discontinues a course while the student is enrolled, the statute mandates a full refund of all
tuition, fees and other charges. 34 The refund
provisions also dictate that all student refunds
are to be made by the school within 30 days from
the date the student gives notice of withdrawal.35
The Illinois law also prohibits false or misleading statements or promises which tend to influence a student to enroll. 36 A school's failure to
make the detailed student disclosures, or the
making of false or inaccurate disclosures is also
prohibited. 37 Finally, any person who suffers
damage by reason of a school's violation of the
law may bring a private civil action against the
school for actual damages and treble damages
where fraud is proved.38 Injunctive relief and
attorney's fees are also made available to aggrieved students. 39 This legislation offers practitioners and students important remedies to redress trade school abuses.
III. Conclusion
While numerous legitimate vocational schools
offer hope to the unskilled and the unemployed, the availability of federal monies has
attracted a large number of unscrupulous school
operators to the industry. As a result, students'
dreams are shattered daily as they realize they
have enrolled in schools which offer little or no
meaningful training. State and federal regulatory agencies have moved slowly to cope with
the growing problem. Litigation efforts on behalf of students may, in the long run, provide the
most effective means of policing the vocational
school industry.
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